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Abstract
A  startling  13  young  workers  attempted  or
committed  suicide  at  the  two  Foxconn
production facilities in southern China between
January and May 2010.  We can interpret  their
acts as protest against a global labor regime that
is widely practiced in China. Their defiant deaths
demand that society reflect upon the costs of a
state-promoted  development  model  that
sacrifices dignity for corporate profit in the name
of  economic  growth.  Chinese  migrant  labor
conditions as articulated by the state, are shaped
by  these  intertwined  forces:  First,  leading
international  brands  have  adopted  unethical
purchasing  practices,  resulting  in  substandard
conditions  in  their  global  electronics  supply
chains.  Second,  management  has  used abusive
and illegal  methods to  raise  worker  efficiency,
generating widespread grievances and resistance
at  the  workplace  level.  Third,  local  Chinese
off ic ia ls  in  col lus ion  with  enterpr ise
management,  systematically  neglect  workers’
rights,  resulting  in  widespread  misery  and
deepened  social  inequalities.  The  Foxconn
human tragedy raises profound concerns about
the  working  lives  of  the  new  generation  of
Chinese migrant workers. It also challenges the
state-driven policy based on the use of internal
rural  migrant  workers,  whose  labor  and
citizenship  rights  have  been  violated.
Key words:  suicide,  protest,  new generation of
migrant  workers,  global  labor  regime,  migrant
wages, electronics manufacturing service (EMS)
industry,  Foxconn,  international  brands,
citizenship,  China
To die is the only way to testify that
we ever lived
Perhaps for the Foxconn employees
and employees like us 
– we who are called nongmingong,
rural migrant workers, in China – 
the use of death is simply to testify
that we were ever alive at all, 
and  that  while  we  lived,  we  had
only despair.
- a worker blog (after the 12th jump
at Foxconn)1
Introduction
Hon  Hai  Precision  Industry  Company,  better
known by its trade name Foxconn (Fushikang),
was  founded  in  Taipei  in  1974.2  Foxconn  is
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currently the world’s largest contract electronics
manufacturer, meaning that it makes most of its
money as a made-to-order manufacturer, not by
selling its own brand products. The company is
poised  to  take  in  over  50  percent  of  global
electronics  manufacturing  service  industry
revenue  by  2011.3  Under  the  leadership  of
founder and CEO Terry Gou, Foxconn declares
itself “the most trusted and preferred partner in
all  aspects  of  global  electronics  outsourcing to
h e l p  c u s t om e r s  d e - r i s k  t h e i r
business.”4 Tragically, in the first five months of
this year as of 27 May 2010, a startling 13 young
workers attempted or committed suicide at the
two Foxconn production  facilities  in  Shenzhen
City  in  southeastern  China,  bringing  a  public
relations  crisis,  and  a  crisis  of  corporate
responsibility,  to virtually all  Foxconn’s image-
conscious customers, including Apple, HP, Dell,
IBM,  Samsung,  Nokia,  Hitachi  and  other
electronic giants.  Ten Chinese migrant workers
died, while three survived their injuries. All were
between 17 and 25 years old—in the prime of
youth.  Their  loss  should  awaken  Chinese  and
international society to reflect upon the costs of a
development  model  that  sacrifices  dignity  for
economic growth.
Foxconn’s  success  testifies  to  the  export-led
dynamism  of  the  Shenzhen  Special  Economic
Zone  under  China’s  open  policy.  In  the  over
twenty years since its initial investment in 1988,
Foxconn  has  grown  to  be  China’s  largest
exporter.  The  electronics  maker  has  a  900,000-
strong workforce in the country,  85 percent of
whom are young people from rural areas.5  We
may say that Foxconn is a microcosm of the lives
of  Chinese  migrant  workers.  When  Time
magazine  nominated  workers  in  China  as  the
runners-up in the 2009 Person of the Year, the
editor  commented  that  Chinese  workers  have
brightened the future of humanity by “leading
the  world  to  economic  recovery.”6  The  new
generation  of  Chinese  migrant  workers
(xinshengdai nongmingong), however, seems to
perceive themselves as losing their futures. The
Foxconn tragedy has been dubbed the “suicide
express” by Chinese media.7
Foxconn Factory, Shenzhen
We can interpret Foxconn employees as having
killed themselves to protest a global labor regime
in which China provides the cutting edge. Under
the reform and open-door policy, China’s export-
oriented  economy  proved  it  could  deliver
economic growth. Asian-invested enterprises and
domestic manufacturers on mainland China have
risen  quickly  to  become  contractors  and  sub-
contractors to Western multinationals, based on
the exploitation of low-paid migrant workers. On
the factory floor, work stress associated with the
race  to  the  bottom  and  the  just-in-time
production mode is intense. Suicide is merely the
extreme manifestation of what migrant workers
in their hundreds of millions experience. Some
suicides  may have  been triggered by  personal
troubles, as Foxconn management would like to
claim. But there is a broader social context shared
by its workers and many others that underlies
the desperate individual actions.
This article reviews the recent Foxconn suicides
as a means to probe the working lives of the new
generation of Chinese migrant workers. We share
the  vision  of  the  Chinese  and  international
scholars who signed an unprecedented letter of
concern about the Foxconn victims in June 2010
calling  for  implementation  of  humane  labor
standards  at  Foxconn  and  other  global
workplaces.8  We  draw  on  worker  interviews
from  our  ongoing  off-site  investigations  at
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Foxconn facilities in southern and eastern China
that began in May 2010 in order to learn about
their  conditions.  We have also  gained insights
from industry and government sources about the
characteristics  and  changing  worldviews  of
younger  workers  from  their  predecessors.  By
providing  an  inside  look  at  the  global  labor
regime, through empirical study of the Foxconn
labor system in China, we highlight the urgent
need  for  progressive  reforms.  Young  migrant
workers,  who  have  been  placed  in  the  “best”
F o x c o n n  f a c t o r y - c um - d o rm i t o r y
environment,9  seemed  only  to  show  greater
anxieties, and to see fewer alternatives than their
peers.  Remedial  efforts  should  rest  on  the
cornerstone  of  workers’  direct  involvement  in
decisions  that  concern  them,  in  the  workplace
and beyond.
In the next section, we discuss the emergence of
the global labor regime in China since the 1980s.
Foxconn employees are a typical representation
of  the  young  generation  of  Chinese  migrant
workers. They want to change their dagong10 or
working-for-the-factory-boss  status  in  the  city,
but they face insurmountable hardships. Foxconn
is an extreme form of this labor predicament, as
we show in the third section on Foxconn’s rise to
become “the electronics workshop of the world.”
Then,  we  propose  a  three-fold  framework  to
explain  the  structural  causes  of  the  Foxconn
suicides. First, leading international brands have
adopted unethical purchasing practices, resulting
in substandard conditions in their supply chains.
Second, Foxconn management has used abusive
methods  to  raise  worker  efficiency,  generating
widespread  grievances  and  resistance.  Third,
local  Chinese  officials  have  colluded  with
enterprises like Foxconn to deprive workers of
legitimate  rights  and  welfare,  resulting  in
deepened  misery  and  widened  soc ia l
inequalities.  It  appears  impossible  for  many
young  workers  to  struggle  through  the  daily
lives they live and eventually fulfill the dreams
they have for the future.
We conclude that  the Foxconn human tragedy
raises profound concerns about the sustainability
of Chinese development and global production.
At the heart of the bigger problem, we suggest, is
that workers in China do not have a functioning
labor union to make their voices heard. On the
bottom  rung  of  the  international  commodity
supply  chain,  millions  of  Chinese  migrant
workers  are  permanently  deprived  of  decent
wages and benefits.  Young workers with rural
origins (hukou,  official  household registration),
like  their  parents,  are  marginalized  citizens.
These  better-educated-youths  long  for  a  life
attuned  to  the  times,  and  the  city  is  where
everything  is  happening.  The  higher  their
aspirations for a better future, the more obvious
the  contrast  to  their  harsh  reality  becomes.
Through  various  forms  of  protest,  of  which
suicide is the most desperate expression, they are
trying to reclaim their rights and dignity.
Global Labor Regime
At a communal setting in a workers’ dormitory
in an industrial town of Shenzhen, China’s fastest
growing  city  with  a  2008  population  officially
estimated at 14 million, we were surrounded by
Foxconn  workers  who  were  chatting  and
watching a soap opera program at the grocery
store in the summer of 2010. It was an open area
where  young  rural  migrant  workers,  most
without a family, spent their limited leisure. The
factory compound was gated and inside the gate,
more than ten dormitory buildings were situated
to  the  south  of  the  company’s  production
facilities.  Outside  the  gate,  more  than  50,000
workers  have  occupied  every  single  village
house, turning them into collective dormitories.
Barred from staying in the city where they sell
their  labor  power,  the  workers  have  to  find
accommodation close to their employer or live in
company dormitories. The newly industrialized
towns  and  cities  in  China  feature  numerous
collective  dormitories  where  a  five-storey
building can house several hundred workers. On
windy nights, the clothes of the workers in the
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dormitory  corridors  f lew  l ike  colorful
multinational flags. These were the flags of the
new  Chinese  working  class,  symbolizing  the
borderless flow of capital and the wretched of the
socialist earth.
China,  if  once  characterized  by  non-capitalist
social relations,11  is now the largest case of the
expanded  reproduction  of  capital  in  the  21st
century.  China  recently  weathered  the  worst
economic crisis of the postwar era to become the
world’s  second  largest  economy,  surpassing
Japan.  With  transnational  and  private  capital
pouring  into  industrial  zones  set  up  in  most
coastal and some inland cities and towns, China
since the 1970s has experienced the world’s most
rapid increase in imports and exports.12 “Made in
China”,  a  label  that  belies  the  actual  wealth
distribution in the global production chain, has
contributed to China’s growing importance in the
global economy.
Chinese wages
China’s  wage  competitiveness  is  both  the
attraction for international and domestic capital
a n d  t h e  o u t c om e  o f  g o v e r nm e n t
policies.13  During the two decades between the
mid-1980s  and  2004,  state  development  plans
had, in effect, bankrupted remote rural areas that
experienced  massive  labor  outflows.14  The
“surplus”  laborers  left  for  more  prosperous
coastal  towns and cities  to  find work through
their historic native-place networks. Meanwhile,
local  governments  encouraged  rural  labor  to
move  to  urban-industrial  districts  through
“poverty  alleviation”  projects,  further  draining
better-educated  and  able-bodied  young  people
who are  most  needed to  build  the  local  rural
economy.15  Under  this  dichotomized rural  and
urban social structure, Chinese industrial wages
have remained very low,  and it  was not  until
2005-06  that  we  witnessed  any  significant
increase.16 The large volume of rural migration is
driven  by  an  urban-biased  economic  model.
While  there  have  been  important,  long-term
demographic  changes  in  the  national  working
population  as  a  result  of  the  one-child  family
policy  implemented  beginning  in  the  1970s,
successive  generations  of  rural-urban  migrants
and  the  potential  pool  of  migrants  in  the
countryside have been and remain large. Chinese
migrant workers have been incorporated within
a global industrial labor regime.
Foxconn workers on the assembly line
Chinese manufacturing wages as a percentage of
US wages,17 compared to those of Japan and East
Asian Tigers like South Korea and Taiwan in the
early  years  of  their  economic  takeoffs,  have
remained consistently low. Economists Erin Lett
and  Judith  Banister  (2009)  estimated  that  the
average  hourly  compensation  costs  of  China’s
manufacturing  workers  in  2006  was  only
US$0.81.18  The Economist  stated that as of July
2010,  the  Chinese  migrant  workforce  “is  still
cheap…just  2.7  percent  of  the  cost  of  their
American counterparts.”19 Based on government
statistics, the labor income share of China’s gross
domestic  product  (GDP)  declined  from  56.5
percent  in  1983  to  36.7  percent  in  2005;  by
contrast, many OECD countries maintained the
ratio of  labor returns to GDP at  60 percent or
more  for  the  comparable  period  of  1978  to
2008.20  If  wages,  particularly  wages  of  rural
migrants have remained low, corporate profits in
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China  have  increased  rapidly,  growing  by  20
percent  between  1978  and  2005,  the  sole
exception being the recession accompanying the
1997-1998  Asian  financial  and  currency
crisis.21 The export sector has turned most of its
profits into enterprise savings, dividends, and re-
investment, rather than sharing it with workers.
Rural  migrant  workers’  income  is  scarcely
enough for  them to make a  minimal  living in
urban areas. A 2004 survey report of the Ministry
of  Labor  and  Social  Security  revealed  that
monthly minimum wages had increased by as
little as 68 yuan over the previous 12 years in the
Pearl  River Delta in Guangdong Province—the
core of the “workshop of the world.”22 Worse yet,
non-payment  of  wages  and  unfair  treatment
remain commonplace while labor disputes have
been on the rise since the 1990s.23
In response, the new government leadership of
Hu  Jintao  and  Wen  Jiabao  took  several  relief
measures  targeting  the  peasantry  and  rural
migrant labor. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Secur i ty  codi f ied  the  minimum  wage
requirements by implementing the Provisions on
the  Minimum Wage  on  1  March  2004  (Zuidi
Gongzi Guiding), with an attempt to strengthen
the  protection  offered  to  workers  by  the
minimum  wage.24  In  June  2007,  the  National
People’s  Congress  (NPC)  Standing  Committee
promulgated the Labor Contract  Law with the
aim  of  protecting  workers’  legitimate  right  to
wages,  benefits,  welfare,  and  employment
security. Scholars have called the law the most
significant piece of Chinese labor legislation in
more  than  a  decade.25  This  year,  the  Central
Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  of  China
(CPC) and the State  Council  jointly issued the
“No.1  Central  Document”  (zhongyang  yihao
wenjian) calling for better coordination of rural
and urban reforms, which highlighted the needs
o f  t h e  n ew  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  m i g r a n t
workers.26  These  rebalancing  efforts  across
different  government  levels,  coupled  with
workers’  spontaneous protests,  have had some
impact  on  both  rural  incomes  and  migrant
wages.27
But  the  global  financial  crisis  resulted  in  the
failure of tens of thousands of factories in late
2008  and  early  2009,  hit  migrant  workers
particularly  hard.28  The  vulnerability  of  the
Chinese  economic  model  that  remains  heavily
dependent  on  the  export  sector  was  clearly
exposed. Sociologist Ho-Fung Hung (2009) uses a
provocative image of China as America’s head
servant—leading other  servants  like  Japan,  the
original Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
and  Hong  Kong),  and  late  exporters  such  as
Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia—which
provides cheap goods for US consumer markets
through  large-volume  exports  and  foreign-
exchange holdings in the form of purchase of US
Treasuries.29 China and its trading partners in the
global  network  of  production  are  increasingly
trapped  in  the  vicissitudes  of  unstable
international markets and the vulnerabilities of
international finance while international capital
reaps the profits from China’s low wage labor.
New-generation of Chinese migrant workers
Rural  migrant  workers  are  the  mainstay  of
China’s  industrial  workforce.  A  March  2010
survey released by China’s National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS), based on a national sample that
covers more than 7,100 villages spread across all
31  provincial-level  units  of  the  country,  the
number of migrant workers reached nearly 230
million in 2009, up 1.9 percent from the previous
year.30  A  subgroup  of  145  million  migrant
workers  had  employment  outside  their  home
villages  and towns (waichu nongmingong),  an
increase  of  3.5  percent  year-on-year.31  Of  this
migrant  group,  a  majority  (61.6  percent)  is
between 16 and 30 years  of  age (see Table 1).
Most  of  the  100  million  new-generations  of
Chinese  migrant  workers—aged  23  on
average—are  unmarried;32  and,  with  financial
and  social  difficulties,  these  younger  migrants
have lots of problems in getting married, raising
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children,  building  homes  in  the  city,  and
supporting  their  village  families.
Young  rural  migrant  workers  (qingnian
nongmingong)  are  facing  a  huge  discrepancy
between  their  expectations  and  reality,  and
between the returns to their labor and the gains
made  by  be t t e r  pa id  urban  workers ,
professionals, and government employees.33 The
Shenzhen Municipal Trade Union and Shenzhen
University,  based  on  the  joint  survey  of  5,000
young migrant workers in Shenzhen city during
April and June 2010, found that the respondents’
average  monthly  wage  was  only  1,838.6  yuan
(US$267)—less than half (47 percent) the amount
Shenzhen resident  employees get.34  This  lump-
sum,  including  a  basic  wage  and hard-earned
overtime  premiums,  scarcely  covers  minimal,
“extra”  expenses  for  one’s  studies  or  leisure
activities. Despite the surveyed migrant workers’
strong desire  to  own property  in  the  city,  the
cheapest housing price in most designated towns
(jianzhi zhen) is 5,000 yuan per square meter, a
level far beyond their reach.35 As holders of rural
household registration status (nongcun hukou),
young  migrants  share  deep  anxieties  over
employment and frustrations about their future
that are a product of being permanently locked
into minimum wage jobs with few benefits  or
rights.
Between  March  and  May  2010,  the  All  China
Federat ion  of  Trade  Unions  (ACFTU)
investigated the social and economic conditions
of  young  migrant  workers  in  10  cities  in
Guangdong,  Fujian,  Shandong,  Liaoning,  and
Sichuan provinces.36  In  June,  the  ACFTU team
published  a  report  that  showed  “the  post-80s
generation” is different from their parents or the
older  working  migrants  with  regard  to  their
demand  for  decent  working  conditions.  These
children of the reform era have grown up. They
came from rural areas with aspirations of living
the  Chinese  dream  in  the  city.  Some  young
people were raised in urban settings when they
followed  their  families  on  the  move  during
childhood (liudong ertong, translated literally as
“mobile  children”),  that  is,  they  are  second
generation  urban  dwellers,  yet  their  formal
residence  remains  in  the  village.37  A  larger
number left their villages or towns (xiangzhen)
immediately after finishing school to seek urban
jobs. Wage employment in large towns and cities
has become young migrants’ primary means of
making a living.
Nationally, the 2009 NBS data showed that 65.1
percent  of  the  rural  migrant  population  was
male.38 Marriage reduces the probability of labor
outflow,  especially  if  there  are  small  children.
While gender segmentation in the labor market is
persistent, young single women and increasingly
men  are  recruited  in  export  factories  where
demand for unskilled, low-cost laborers grows.
The  ACFTU  researchers  found  that  the  new
generation of migrant workers is becoming more
concerned  about  the  overal l  working
environment—wages  and  benefits  as  well  as
opportunities  for  self-development.  Migrant
worke r s  a r e  p r imar i l y  emp loyed  in
manufacturing  and service  work,  as  shown in
Table 2.
Young  migrants  are  increasingly  aware  of
equality and rights, and have higher expectations
of  getting  fair  work  opportunities,  labor  and
social  welfare,  and other  basic  public  services.
This  is  partly  explained  by  their  higher
educational qualifications. Of the 145.33 million
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migrant workers,  based on the 2009 NBS data,
nearly one-third (31.1 percent) of those between
21 and 25 years of age hold high school diplomas
or  degrees.39  They  have  higher  aspirations  for
career  advancement  than  the i r  o lder
counterparts. A 2007 China Youth and Children
Research  Center  report,  based  on  a  survey  of
4,673 young migrant workers employed in four
sectors—construction in Beijing City, mining in
Tangshan  City,  manufacturing  in  Shandong
Province, and services in Chengdu City, reflected
the respondents’ wish to equip themselves with
specialized knowledge and skills (69.7 percent),
legal training (54.7 percent), and cultural learning
(47.8 percent).40
Those  classified  as  migrant  workers,  including
second generations living and working in cities,
are  categorically  treated  as  part  of  the  rural
population, even though they work and live in
the urban areas, some for many years. In their
everyday life, they face numerous difficulties in
accessing basic community services because they
are  not  recognized  as  local  residents.  Their
legitimate rights are not effectively protected: the
ACFTU study found that only 34.8 percent are
provided with basic  medical  care,  21.3  percent
pension  insurance,  and  just  8.5  percent  are
eligible  for  unemployment  benefits.41  Factory
owners, often protected by local labor authorities
and judicial departments, frequently neglect legal
responsibilities  for  employees.  Chinese  Labor
Law, often honored in the breach, requires not
only 100 percent full coverage on all three types
of social insurance but also mandatory protection
and  benefits  for  work  injuries,  occupational
diseases,  and  child-birth  (Article  73) .
Collaboration between the local state and factory
management, however, allows many companies
to evade their legal responsibilities to labor.
The  global  labor  regime  is  rooted  in  the
deprivation  of  migrant  workers’  labor  and
citizenship  rights.  A  topic  of  mainstream
discussion,  if  not outright criticism, concerning
the young generation of workers is their inability
to “eat bitterness” (chi ku). It is commonly said
that  those  who  were  born  after  1980,  in  the
market  economy and the  new society,  are  not
tough  enough  to  endure  hardship.  They  are
emotionally  or  psychologically  vulnerable  to
pressures. What they need is to work diligently
and to improve their skills. The elite groups of
the government and employers have a stake in
this  discourse  since  they  need  low-cost,
disciplined laborers  to  fuel  the Chinese export
economy. But as exploitation intensifies, it may
spark  stronger  local  protests,  as  world  labor
theorist  Beverly  Silver  (2003)  has  convincingly
argued.42
Foxconn:  “The  Electronics  Workshop  of  the
World”
The subsidiary Foxconn was a product of parent
company  Hon  Hai’s  massive  production  of
electronic  connectors  since the 1980s when the
personal computer market took shape.43 In 1988,
chairman  and  founder  Terry  Gou  invested  in
low-cost  manufacturing  in  mainland  China,
while retaining research and development (R&D)
at  its  Taiwan  headquarters.44  From  the  early
1990s,  the  company  set  up  more  than  40
manufacturing facilities and R&D centers in Asia
(India, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
Japan,  South  Korea,  and  Australia),  Russia,
Europe (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, the United
Kingdom, and Turkey), and the Americas.45 The
technology  group  boasts  that  it  provides  its
customers  with  “the  best  speed,  quality,
engineering  services,  efficiency,  and  added
v a l u e , ”  wha t  i t  c a l l s  t h e  f i v e  c o r e
competences.46  But  what  has  it  done  for  the
450,000  largely  migrant  workers  who  produce
the  products  at  its  two  Shenzhen  plants  or
elsewhere? The results suggest continued growth
and  high  profits  made  possible  by  Chinese
workers, the vast majority of whom continue to
labor  at  state-mandated  minimum wages,  and
who  have  seen  few  if  any  gains  from  the
company’s growth.
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In  2001,  Hon  Hai  became  Taiwan’s  largest
private-sector  company  in  terms  of  sales,
g e n e r a t i n g  r e v e n u e  o f  U S $ 4 . 4
billion.47  BusinessWeek,  as  early  as  2002,
a c c l a im ed  T e r r y  Gou  “ t h e  k i n g  o f
outsourcing”48—when Foxconn was still  behind
longstanding  electronics  manufacturing  service
leaders Solectron (FY 2001, US$18.7 billion)49 and
Flextronics  (FY  2001,  US$12.1  billion).50  Since
2003,  the  Taiwan-based  company  has  been
China’s  biggest  exporter.51  In  2008,  Foxconn’s
revenue  reached  US$61.8  billion,52  of  which
exports accounted for US$55.6 billion, about 3.9
percent of all exports from China.53 Despite the
sharp  contraction  of  American  and  European
demand  for  consumer  electronics  during  the
recent  economic  downturn,  Foxconn generated
US$59.3 billion in revenue in 2009, only a slight
drop in sales of  4.1 percent from the previous
year (see chart 1).54
In  the  wake  of  the  global  economic  recovery,
Foxconn’s business has been growing fast. By the
end of the first six months in 2010, the company’s
sales had jumped 48 percent from a year earlier
to  NT$1.2  trillion  (US$37.43  billion)  and  net
income increased 22 percent to NT$34.7 billion
(US$1.08 billion).55 Foxconn, despite bad publicity
at  home and abroad followed the string of  13
Foxconn worker suicides by May, and pressure
to increase wages in Shenzhen and global calls
for  a  boycott  of  Foxconn’s  products  including
Apple iPhones for a month in June,56  recorded
thriving exports. In the electronics manufacturing
service market, Foxconn’s revenue is almost three
times  higher  than  it  closest  rival,  Singapore-
based Flextronics.
Foxconn products and services
Foxconn  executives  control  labor-related
expenses  and  reduce  product  time-to-market
aggressively. Foxconn churns out a wide array of
products  from  low-end  to  technologically
sophisticated, for the world’s top brands. It also
provides  design  engineering  and  mechanical
tooling services.
The  technology  group  has  expanded  its  “3C”
product  range57—computers  (desktop,  laptop,
and  tablet  computers),  communications
equipment  (mobile  phones  and  smartphones),
and consumer products  (digital  music  players,
digital cameras, and game consoles)—to include
three more “C’s”: cars (automotive electronics),
channels (for electronics and computer products,
such  as  motherboards),58  and  content  (e-book
readers,  a  software and hardware platform for
the display of e-books).59  Diversity of  products
enhances Foxconn’s market competitiveness. The
company  is  advancing  into  high-end  fields  of
nanotechnology,  heat  transfer,  wireless
connectivity,  material  sciences,  and  “green”
manufacturing processes.60 The electronics giant
has  accumulated  more  than  25,000  patents
worldwide.61
Foxconn  shortens  i ts  supply  chain  by
manufacturing some parts in-house. Spokesman
Arthur  Huang62  explained the  company’s  cost-
saving strategy:
We either outsource the components
manufacturing to other suppliers, or
we  can  research  and  manufacture
our own components. We even have
contracts  with  mines  which  are
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located near our factories.
Business  integration  is  central  to  Foxconn’s
expansion  and  development.  In  vertical
integration, Foxconn synthesizes two specialties
to offer customers cost-effective advantages:63
There  are  two  categor ies  o f
manufacturers  in  the  information
and  communication  technology
(ICT) supply chain. The first focuses
on  the  design  and  assembly  of
electronic  components  such  as
circuit  boards,  data  storage  or
displays….The  second  category
focuses  on  making  the  structural
elements for electronic products (the
enclosures  or  cases  for  electronic
products)….Foxconn has integrated
these  two  formerly  separated
specialties  to  create  a  new,  more
efficient business model.
Foxconn undercuts its competitors on the price,
speed  of  delivery,  and  quality  of  its  finished
products.
Foxconn customers
Foxconn possesses a large team of engineers and
marketing managers to serve its worldwide client
base.  The  company  ranked  112 th  by  annual
revenue  in  the  For tune  Globa l  500  in
2010—larger  than  some  of  the  companies  for
which  it  manufactures  products  such  as
Microsoft,  Nokia,  Dell,  Apple,  Cisco  Systems,
Intel,  or Motorola (see table 3).64  On a revenue
basis,  HP  remains  the  largest  company  in
segments  of  personal  computers,  servers,  and
printers.
The growth in earnings of Foxconn, however, is
not comparable to that of leading brands such as
Apple  and  Microsoft .  Based  on  market
capitalization,  in  May  2010  Apple  (at  US$237
billion) overtook Microsoft (at US$221 billion) as
the  global  number  one  in  the  technology
industry.65 Apple thus became the world’s most
v a l u a b l e  i n f o rma t i o n  t e c hno l o gy
company.66  Among  all  types  of  companies
worldwide,  Apple’s  market  capitalization  is
second only to oil giant Exxon Mobil (at US$315
billion). By the end of fiscal year 2010, Apple’s
revenue—by sales—is projected to grow 46 per
cent to US$62.6 billion,67 moving up quickly into
the top 100 global companies ranked by Fortune.
Foxconn  relies  heavily  on  its  made-to-order
business  from  top  technology  firms  (and
increasingly auto brands). Benefiting from strong
orders  during the  economic  recovery,  Foxconn
shipped over 6 million notebooks in the first half
of  2010.68  Foxconn’s  laptop  shipments  to  HP
alone could reach 10 to 12 million units by the
end of this year, and total shipments to HP are
projected  to  increase  to  20  million  units  in
2011.69  As of July 2010, Foxconn has surpassed
Quanta Computer to become Dell’s third largest
supplier of notebooks (behind only Wistron and
Compal Electronics).  Foxconn will fulfill  4 to 5
million notebook orders for Dell in 2011.70
To cope with this expansive market, Foxconn has
built  a  huge  workforce  worldwide,  including
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some 900,000 in China alone. It is expected that
the company will grow by more than 40 percent
to 1.3 million Chinese workers71—most of them
young rural  migrants  and  student  interns—by
2011.
Foxconn production in China
Foxconn  has  taken  advantage  of  China’s
macroeconomic  pol ic ies  to  expand  i ts
investments.  The technology company operates
facilities  in  four  strategic  geographic  regions
across  the  country:  the  Pearl  River  Delta
(Shenzhen, Dongguan, Foshan, and Zhongshan),
the  Yangtze  River  Delta  (Shanghai,  Kunshan,
Hangzhou,  Ningbo,  Nanjing,  Huaian,  Jiashan,
and Changshu),  the  Bohai  Gulf  area  of  North
China (Beijing, Langfang, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin,
Taiyuan,  Yantai,  Yingkou,  and Shenyang),  and
central and western cities (Chongqing, Chengdu,
Zhengzhou ,  Wuhan ,  J i n cheng ,  and
Nanning).72  Foxconn’s  access  to  resources  and
talent in major Chinese cities is fundamental to
its growth.
While the Chinese government froze minimum
wages  throughout  2009  in  response  to  the
economic  crisis,  since  early  2010,  a  number  of
cities and provinces have raised minimum wages
from 10 to 30 percent.73 In China, in short, there is
no national minimum wage but a checkerboard
of  city  and  provincial  minimum  wages.  It  is
interesting to note that Beijing and Tianjin retain
minimum wages well under those for Shenzhen
and  Shanghai,  while  inland  cities  such  as
Chengdu,  Zhengzhou  and  Chongqing  bid  for
investment  with  minimum wages  that  are  far
lower. Migrant labor shortage (mingong huang
or yonggong huang) in the Pearl River Delta and
Yangtze River Delta has spurred higher wages as
the area competes for labor. In contrast, investors
like  Foxconn  find  inland  cities  increasingly
attractive  as  they  offer  cheaper  land  and
improved infrastructure with lower wages and
social  insurance  costs  than  the  eastern  and
southern coastal regions that initially led export-
oriented growth (see Table 4).
In  the  face  of  the  worker  suicide  scandal  and
anti-sweatshop campaigns targeting Foxconn at
home and abroad, Foxconn reportedly raised its
Shenzhen workers’ wages to 1,200 yuan (US$176)
a month beginning 1 June 2010.74  Compared to
the  minimum wage  standard  set  in  Shenzhen
(effective 1 July 2010),  Foxconn’s adjusted base
pay  is  only  9  percent  higher  than  the  legal
minimum level.75 Still, this meager pay raise for
its  450,000  employees—half  of  the  company’s
workforce  totaled  900,000  persons  in  the
country—led  cost-sensitive  Foxconn  corporate
directors and shareholders to accelerate the pace
of  factory relocation.  At  the  same time,  facing
growing consumer and public  outcry,  Foxconn
announced  a  second  pay  raise  for  “qualified”
workers  up  to  2,000  yuan  (US$293)  a  month,
effective  1  October.76  Senior  management,
however, has refused to disclose the details of the
three-month  review  which  could  allow  some
workers to earn higher pay. As yet there is no
indication  of  how  many  of  the  production
workers will  eventually benefit  from the wage
policy.77  Meanwhile, in June, following the first
pay  raise,  Foxconn  stopped  hiring  at  its  two
largest Shenzhen campuses.78 Over the next five
years, according to company sources, the number
of Foxconn workers at its Shenzhen facilities will
be reduced by over 30 percent to around 300,000
persons.79 Foxconn Shenzhen employees are now
being relocated to other campuses.
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Foxconn is actively moving production to inland
cities and to the north to save on costs and to tap
new business opportunities.  Zhongguo Xinwen
Zhoukan (China Newsweek)80 ran a cover story
titled  “fight  to  grab  Foxconn”  (zheng  qiang
Fushikang) in its July 2010 issue at the peak of a
new  round  of  coordinated  efforts  by  local
governments to woo Foxconn. Many inland and
northern  cities  have  competed  fiercely  for  the
chance to host a Foxconn base, providing both
low  wages  and  subsidies  that  drive  down
relocation costs.
As early as 2009, Foxconn and other electronics
makers81  gained  from  the  government’s  fiscal
stimulus  package  to  set  up  new  facilities  in
Chongqing  municipality,  China’s  largest  and
rapidly growing Western city.
Chongqing  launched  its  Warm
Winter stimulus plan [following the
global  financial  crisis  of  2008],
spending  vast  sums,  including
credit  programs to  allow many of
the 3.5 million unemployed workers
to  start  their  own  businesses,
prov id ing  loans  and  cred i t
guarantees  to  small  business,
launching start-up industrial parks,
providing direct  subsidies  to  1,500
businesses.82
Chongqing  employment  promotion  officials
granted Foxconn a discounted corporate income
tax rate of 15 percent, 10 percent lower than the
standard rate.83 Moreover, the local government
will lengthen the airport runway by 400 meters to
meet  increasing  transportation  and  logistical
needs.84  In  June  2010,  Foxconn  signed  an
agreement  with  119  Chongqing  vocational
schools  to  arrange  student  internships  and
employment  at  its  local  plants.85  The company
plans to recruit 100,000 people in the city, whose
minimum wage is a fraction of that of Shanghai
and Shenzhen.
Foxconn will continue to increase investment in
western China, especially in Chengdu, capital of
Sichuan  Province.  In  June  2009,  Sichuan
provincial  and  Chengdu  city  officials  led  a
delegation to Foxconn headquarters in Taiwan to
sign  a  memorandum of  cooperation.  In  2010,
Foxconn registered to build Futaihua Precision
Electronics  (Chengdu) and Hongfujin Precision
Electronics  (Chengdu),  focusing  on  tablet
c ompu t e r  a nd  d i g i t a l  s e t - t o p  b o x
assembly.86 Local government officials promised
to  attract  other  industries  to  relocate  and  “go
west” to boost economic growth.
On 2 August 2010, Foxconn began production in
Zhengzhou,  the  provincial  capital  of  central
China’s Henan. A local government official said
publicly,  “We’ve  provided  many  conveniences
for Foxconn’s locating here,  such as opening a
fast  track  for  the  import  of  its  facilities  and
construction  materials.”87  Foxconn  rented  a
renovated factory and dormitory from the local
government for its 100,000 employees. Officials
have allocated land to build a permanent plant
with an eventual capacity of 300,000 staff, where
the  first  phase  of  construction  will  cover  133
hectares.88  The  Henan  Education  Bureau,
vocational  schools,  colleges  and  universities
“mobilized” students to participate in Foxconn
internship  programs,  which  was  reportedly  a
requirement  to  complete  their  vocational
training.89  Both temporary student workers and
employees  are  responsible  for  making  Apple
iPhones, which will hit a daily output of 200,000
units at full capacity.90
It is obvious that Foxconn aims to consolidate its
production clusters across China to build a cost-
competitive  network.  Local  government
incentives  offered to  Foxconn over  these  more
than  20  years  have  contributed  greatly  to  its
economic success. Beginning in the fall of 2010,
the company plans to open retail  stores to sell
e l e c t r o n i c s  g a d g e t s  f o r  d ome s t i c
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consumption.91  This  move  is  intended  to
diversify  from  its  export-oriented  business
model.
Young  Workers:  Struggling  Inside  “Foxconn
City”
Foxconn  describes  its  Shenzhen  Longhua
manufacturing  site,  sub-divided  into  11  zones
listed alphabetically from A to K, as a campus. It
is the biggest technological park in China where
300,000  workers,  or  as  many  as  one-third  of
Foxconn’s  workforce  in  the  country,  is  based.
Company  profile  and  media  reports92  mention
that the 2.3-square-kilometer campus includes:
Factories,  dormitories,  banks,
hospitals, a post office, a fire brigade
with two fire engines, an exclusive
television  network,  an  educational
institute,  bookstores,  soccer  fields,
basketball  courts,  track  and  field,
swimming pools, supermarkets, and
a  collection  of  cafeterias  and
restaurants.
Fieldwork  confirms  that  most  of  the  Foxconn
employees  in  China  are  young  migrants  who
work and live on the campuses. These workers
produce  and  assemble  high-quality  electronics
products.  A  tagline  of  Foxconn’s  worldwide
recruitment advertisement reads, “The Foxconn
brand is the talent of its workforce” (in original
Chinese,  rencai  shi  Hon Hai  de  pinpai).93  The
evidence suggests, however, that the company is
losing  its  most  precious  talent.  By  the  end  of
May, 12 Foxconn workers had jumped or fallen
to their deaths and the 13th jumper, a 25-year-old
worker, slit his wrists after being stopped from
jumping from a dormitory (see table 5).  Given
recent  events,  the  term  used  to  refer  to
employees, “the people of Foxconn” or fu kang
ren, rings with dark irony as the Chinese, literally
translated,  means  “wealthy”  and  “healthy”
people.
Foxconn publicized visits by psychologists with
the  dismissive  suggestion  that  the  number  of
suicides at its two Shenzhen workplaces is below
the national level,94 in an insensitive attempt both
to evade responsibility and to hide the problem.
No genuine scientific study would base itself on
such  a  comparison  which  leaves  out  of
consideration that the Foxconn suicides were of
young people employed in the city.95 Nor would
it consider it  the “norm” that Chinese workers
commit  suicide  to  fight  terrible  working
conditions.
Grieving family of Ma Xianqian protests his
death outside the Foxconn factory
Here  we  present  our  field  data,  industry
analyses, and investigative reports by the media
and labor rights groups in order to gain a deeper
understanding of the problems. We call on the
three main players, namely, international brand-
name  corporations,  Foxconn,  and  local  and
 APJ | JF 8 | 37 | 2
13
national governments to act responsibly to stop
this trend of Foxconn employees’ choosing to end
their young lives.
Outsourcing, Apple profits, and low wages
From the perspective of supply chain purchasing
power,  leading  international  brands  have
tremendous  influence  over  their  contract
manufacturers. Thus far, however, we find that
Apple and other global companies are squeezing
their suppliers worldwide with little concern for
the  effects  of  their  actions  on the  people  who
produce  these  products.  Apple  has  reportedly
expanded  and  d ive r s i f i ed  i t s  As i an
manufacturing  investment.96  Industry  analysts
estimate that the operating profit margins among
major electronics suppliers were at  best  4 to 5
percent  on  average  in  2007.97  By  product
segment,  competition for  orders  is  expected to
further lower notebook makers’ gross margins in
2011 from the already low level of 4 percent in
2010.98
Apple,  which  enjoyed  record  profits  amid  the
economic  crisis,  continues  to  seize  every
opportunity  to  secure  lower  prices  from
suppliers.  Indeed,  industry  sources  suggested
that Apple awarded iPhone orders to Foxconn
after  Foxconn  agreed  to  sell  parts  at  “zero
profit".99 Foxconn probably agreed to the deal in
order  to  keep  other  more  lucrative  Apple
contracts and to kill its competitors. It offered a
rock-bottom  price  made  possible  by  its  big
market size to secure a leading industry position.
Apple revenues for the fiscal 2009 first quarter
exceeded US$10 billion.100
Will Apple and other corporate icons be able
to distance themselves from the plight of
Chinese workers assembling their products?
Steve Jobs addressed the Foxconn issue at a
press conference while a Chinese protester
demanded equitable treatment for workers.
Foxconn assembles best-selling hand-held mobile
devices for Apple like iPods, the iPhone 4 (the
latest  design  of  Apple-branded  smartphones),
and iPads (tablet computers that are thinner and
lighter  than  netbooks  or  mini  notebooks).
According to market research firm iSuppli,  the
part-and-component cost101 of a 16Gbyte version
iPhone 4 is  US$187.5,  less  than one-third (31.3
percent)  of  the  selling  price  of  US$599.  It  is
estimated that Apple commands gross margins
in  the  range  of  50  percent  on  the  iPhone,
compared  to  20  percent  to  40  percent  for
competitor products.102
Apple  rides  high-margin  hardware  to  market
supremacy, taking the lion’s share of the profit.
The iPad went on sale on 3 April 2010. In June,
Apple announced that it sold 3 million iPads in
the 80 days after its introduction in the United
States.103 iSuppli analyzed that the manufacturing
cost of an Apple iPad is only US$9, or 1.8 percent
of the lowest-priced US$499 iPad, and that the
cost of materials is estimated at US$250.6, or 50.2
percent  of  the  retail  price.104  With  less  than  2
percent of the cost of the cheapest iPad per unit
going  to  a  manufacturer,  Foxconn  production
workers get even less.
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In  outsourcing  production,  Apple  is  the  most
profitable  of  the  top  technology  firms.  For  its
fiscal 2010 third quarter,  Apple posted all-time
record  revenues  of  US$15.7  billion,  with  a  fat
gross  margin  at  39.1  percent.105  The  company
statement describes “a phenomenal quarter that
exceeded our expectations all around, including
the most  successful  product  launch in Apple’s
history with  iPhone 4.  iPad is  off  to  a  terrific
start…and we have amazing new products still
to come this year.” An analyst at DigiTimes says
Apple has ordered 24 million units of the iPhone
4 for this year alone from Foxconn,106 and many
more orders for iPads are expected to follow.
Buyers of Foxconn products want their iPhones
and computers manufactured fast to meet global
demand. For example, Apple is trying to get its
white  models  of  iPhone  4  out  to  the  market
without  delay,  while  keeping  up  with  the
availability  of  black  models.107  This  drive  for
productivity  and  quality  leads  to  constant
pressure  on  Foxconn  workers.  The  electronics
parts and components are assembled quickly as
they  move  up  the  24-hour  non-stop  conveyor
belts. At the same time, the workers’ youth and
sweat are expended on the relentless machines.
Foxconn  benefits  from both  the  influx  of  big-
volume  orders  and  the  hard  work  of  young
migrant laborers. However, its profit is not at all
comparable  to  that  of  top  brands.  Under  the
direct pressure of Apple and other buyers, and
the  hunger  for  ever  more  corporate  profit,
Foxconn,  as  of  31  May  2010,  paid  450,000
production  line  workers  at  its  two  Shenzhen
plants only 900 yuan (US$132) a month for a 40
hour week. In other words, Foxconn has set its
maximum  base  wages  at  the  local  minimum
wage standard.
But  how  much  did  workers  actually  earn?
Journalists  from  the  Beijing  Qingnian  Bao
(Beijing Youth Daily) published a wage stub of a
Foxconn Shenzhen worker for November 2009 on
7 June 2010.108 It clearly shows:
The worker’s total monthly income
is 2,149.5 yuan. The basic salary is
900  yuan,  which  is  the  local
compulsory  minimum wage  for  a
normal  working  month  of  21.75
days.  All  the  remaining income is
the worker’s overtime payment for
136  hours  [precisely  100  hours
above the legal maximum overtime
limit].
In this example, 60 percent of the monthly total
wage is from doing overtime work. The worker is
not in the minority at Foxconn. According to a
5,044-person survey conducted by the Shenzhen
Human Resources  and  Social  Security  Bureau,
72.5  percent  of  the Foxconn workforce  put  up
with working hours far  beyond legal  limits  to
earn extra income.109
To  safeguard  workers’  rights  to  a  basic
livelihood,  rights  group  Hong  Kong-based
Students  and  Scholars  Against  Corporate
Misbehavior (SACOM) calculated that the living
wage  standard  in  Shenzhen  should  be  2,297.3
yuan (US$337) a month.110 China Labor Bulletin
agreed that a basic wage of 2,000 yuan a month is
“absolutely  necessary”  in  Shenzhen,  on  the
border l ine  of  Hong  Kong. 1 1 1  Foxconn
management  has  not  thoroughly  reviewed  its
management method in the wake of the suicides.
Taiwan  unions  and  labor  groups  protested  at
Foxconn’s  headquarters  asking,  “What  is  the
price of a human body” (xue rou he jia)?112 At a
press conference in Taipei, scholars read an open
statement  co-signed  by  180  Taiwan  academics
dated 13  June  2010.  It  stated that  “recent  pay
raises  [at  Foxconn]  do  not  address  the
problem...we  believe  that  the  Foxconn  suicide
cluster is a bitter accusation made with 13 young
lives  against  the  inhumane,  exploitative
regime.”113
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What is the price of a human body? Dozens of
demonstrators protested outside Hon Hai’s
Taipei headquarters on 28 May 2010, urging
the company to respect life and improve
treatment of its workers. They laid flowers for
the 10 dead Foxconn workers. Photo credit:
Wang Hao-zhong (2010).
At the  root-cause  level,  global  brands  such as
Apple  pressure  suppliers  like  Foxconn  to
compete against each other on price, quality, and
delivery. To secure contracts, Foxconn minimizes
costs,  and transfers  the  pressure  of  low profit
margins  to  frontline  workers.  The  pressure  to
keep up with new, competitively priced orders
forces  Foxconn  workers  to  new  levels  of
exhaustion.
Foxconn  employees  experience  long  hours  of
repetitive  work  for  very  low  income.  They
submit to management scrutiny on the job, and
their low income and limited free time restricts
their options outside of work. Many young men
and women workers rarely stop working except
to eat and sleep, simply to make ends meet. The
result  is  a community of people under intense
stress with few resources, a situation conducive
to depression.
Taiwan unions and labor activists unfurl
white banners to mourn the Young Foxconn
workers in a protest against Hon Hai on 28
May 2010, Taipei. (Left) For wealth and
power— physical and mental health spent,
hopes lost (Right) For profit of the
brand—youth spent, dreams shattered. Photo
credit to Wang Hao-zhong (2010).
Foxconn  management,  labor  discipline,  and
pressures
Foxconn executives continued to insist that their
treatment of workers was “world class”114  even
after the 8th jump since the beginning of the year
on 11 May 2010. Replying to international media
inquiries,  Foxconn  insisted  that  the  company
“has  provided  workers  with  a  far  better
envi ronment  and  benef i t s  [ than]  the
manufacturing  industry  as  a  whole.”115  Public
criticism  from  China  Labor  Watch  (New
York)116  and  China  Labor  Bulletin  (Hong
Kong)117 mounted, emphasizing not the facilities
per  se  but  workers’  health  and  well-being.
Company  boss  Terry  Gou  finally  broke  his
silence over the then 10 worker suicides on 24
May,  but  only  to  deny  that  he  was  running
“blood and sweat factories.”118
The  record  number  of  suicides,  said  Foxconn,
was not related to its management style, working
conditions,  or  wage  policies.  Spokesperson
Edmund Ding told the media that some of the
w o r k e r s  h a d  h a d  “ p e r s o n a l
problems.”119  Accordingly,  Foxconn  established
an Employee Care Center and set up a 24-hour
 APJ | JF 8 | 37 | 2
16
hotline  service  to  help  employees  maintain
“mental health.”120  Employees can hit punching
bags with pictures of their  supervisors to vent
their  anger  and  frustration  in  newly-opened
stress-release rooms.121  Senior management also
invited a group of psychologists to try to suggest
ways for Foxconn’s 300,000 young employees in
the  Longhua  faci l i ty  to  cope  with  “the
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a n d  em o t i o n a l
needs.”122 Meanwhile, Foxconn brought in monks
in an attempt to release the souls of the deceased
employees  from  suffering  and  to  dispel
misfortune.123 The conducting of the religious rite,
however,  could not stop the 11th,  12th,  and 13th
jumps  from taking  place.  After  the  attempted
suicide  on  27  May,  Foxconn  began  to  install
3,000,000 square meters of  safety nets  between
dormitory buildings to prevent employees from
killing  themselves  by jumping off  the  rooftop.
CEO  Terry  Gou  called  them  “ai  xin  wang,”
translated  literally  as  “nets  with  a  loving
heart.”124 But the question is: can the nets really
help save lives?
We question Foxconn’s framing of the suicides as
isolated, individual cases in a typical instance of
blaming  the  victims.  Following  a  string  of
employee suicides at the two Shenzhen plants,
Foxconn announced that it would test incoming
employees  to  identify  any  hidden  “mental
health” issues125 in all its manufacturing facilities
across  China.  Management  claimed the  deaths
were  primarily  related  to  the  immaturity  and
fragile state of mind of the young rural migrants.
Their  victim-blaming  approach  suggested  that
they  are  reluctant  to  review  workplace-based
problems and their negative impact on workers’
state of mind and body.
Military culture
“A  leader,”  says  Terry  Gou,  must  have  the
decisive  courage  to  be  “a  dictator  for  the
common good” (ducai  wei  gong).126  Under  his
leadership, the Foxconn Longhua flagship plant
has constructed its own “city” within Shenzhen
City,  where  company  managers  and  security
officers  retain supra-governmental  control  over
its  employees.  An  extreme  example  is  that
Foxconn workers who made emergency calls to
the  police  through  in-factory  telephones  were
automatically  transferred  to  Foxconn’s  own
private  security  department!127  There  seems no
alternate avenue for  workers to seek help and
support.
Management has hired more than 1,000 security
guards  to  keep  internal  order  in  the  Foxconn
Longhua plant (no littering, no jay-walking, and
so on) and prevent unauthorized persons from
entering  sensitive  areas.128  Workers  wear
uniforms color-coded by their department. Every
factory  building  and  dormitory  has  security
checkpoints with guards standing by 24 hours a
day.
All  employees,  whether  they  are  going  to  the
toilet or going to eat, must be checked. Workers
swipe electronic  staff  cards at  the gates,  while
outsiders  such  as  truck  drivers  leave  their
fingerprints on recognition scanners.129 To thwart
rivals  intent  on  industrial  espionage,  the
company bars  employees  from bringing music
players  or  mobile  phones onto the shop floor.
Body  searches  are  not  uncommon.  Men
reportedly must take off belts with metal buckles
and women their wired bras before they can pass
the electronic security systems.
The “Foxconn Empire” is infamous for its heavy-
handed security. Reports from official and media
sources  about  detention,  abuse,  and  use  of
violence  by  company  security  personnel  are
numerous.  A tragic  example  was the  death of
Sun Danyong at Foxconn’s Longhua plant on 16
July 2009.  Sun, a 25-year-old Yunnan graduate
from the  Harbin  Institute  of  Technology,  was
held responsible for losing one of 16 prototypes
of Apple’s fourth-generation iPhone. He jumped
from the 12th floor of his apartment building to
his death. Foxconn issued a statement:130
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Regardless  of  the reason for  Sun’s
suicide,  it  is  to  some  extent  a
reflection  of  Foxconn’s  internal
management deficiencies, especially
in how to help young workers cope
with the psychological pressures of
working life at the company.
The  “psychological  pressures”  referred  to
included  being  suspected  of  s teal ing,
interrogation,  and  solitary  confinement  by
security officers, and having his home searched.
He  was  allegedly  beaten  and  humiliated.  His
final online chat with his friends revealed both
his agony and relief, “Thinking that I won’t be
bullied  tomorrow,  won’t  have  to  be  the
scapegoat,  I  feel  much  better.”131
Scandals about Foxconn security officers’ use of
force made headlines only weeks after the loss of
the company’s young employee. The location this
time was Beijing, a main assembly site for Nokia
and  Motorola  mobile  phones.  In  Foxconn’s
Beijing plant,  security guards,  according to the
company  investigative  report,132  fought  with
workers  on  6  August  2009.  Commentators,
referring  to  online  videos  about  the  fight  and
worker interviews, held that physical and verbal
v i o l e n c e  i s  s y s t em i c  i n  F o x c o n n
system.133  Workers are harassed and beaten up
without serious cause. A manager responded to
public concern by stating that “the incident was a
misunderstanding.”134 Disciplinary actions taken
against  the  workers,  if  any,  were  not  publicly
reported.
In the name of keeping strict confidentiality for
its  buyers  like  Apple,  Nokia,  and  Motorola,
Foxconn  retains  a  veritable  army  of  private
security officers. The high-level, round-the-clock
alerting device installed at Foxconn is justified by
its  contractual  responsibility  to  secure  its
customers’  rights  to  intellectual  property.  Any
leak of “business information” will result in big
financial losses.135 In this way, global technology
multinationals  have  transmitted  extreme
pressure all the way to the Chinese shop floor.
Foxconn  workers  are  watched  on  or  off  the
production line.
Despair and loss of hope
The  post-80s  and  post-90s  new  generation  of
migrant workers have higher expectations of life
than their elders, and feel greater disappointment
and resentment at their failures. After 19-year-old
Li Hai climbed the fence on the 5th floor of the
company training center to jump to his death on
25 May 2010 (dubbed the “11th jumper”), police
found a suicide note apologizing to his family.
The note indicated that Li had “lost confidence in
his future.”136 It reads: My expectations of what I
could  do  at  work  and  for  my  family  far
outweighed what could be achieved.
Li was born in 1991 in a poverty-stricken village
in Hunan province. His rural family of four had
contracted a tiny farm of only three-mu, just half
an acre. His cousin told him that he could make
money  by  working  at  Foxconn.  Selling  a
motorbike for 300 yuan to buy a train ticket, he
traveled  to  the  southern  metropolis.137  At  the
Shenzhen  Guanlan  plant,  during  the  42  work
days,  he  was  allegedly  scolded  by  his  line
supervisor  almost  every  day.  His  suicide  note
continues:
I like drawing, like the girl Xiao Ye,
but really dislike … [fushikang].
Li, a fresh school graduate, became disillusioned
with the Foxconn way of life. Coming from the
countryside,  he  found  fitting  into  the  robotic
assembling  process,  at  high  speed  and  to  a
precision measured down to  the  second,  most
difficult.  Feeling  unable  to  go  back  home,  he
ended his life in the early morning. Shenzhen city
did  not  turn  out  to  be  his  dreamland  of
opportunities.
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Lu Xin, another Hunan native, jumped from the
6th  floor  at  Foxconn’s  Shenzhen  Longhua
apartment  on  6  May  2010  (dubbed  the  “7 th
jumper”).138  Like  Li  Hai,  Lu  needed money to
improve his rural family’s living conditions. As a
university graduate, Lu, got a starting base pay
rate of 2,000 yuan, more than double that of line
workers.  During his  eight months of  work,  he
managed to remit home more than 13,000 yuan,
all by doing excessive overtime work. His blog
post  dated  26  October  2009,  cited  by  China
Central Television (CCTV), reads:139
I came to this company for money.
[But then I realized], this is a waste
of my life and my future. In the first
step  of  my  adult  life,  I  took  the
wrong path. I’m lost.
Lu was assigned to the production department,
not his preferred research and development unit.
In April 2010, he was working everyday until 9
p.m. According to Chinese law, normal working
hours should not exceed 8 hours a day and 40
hours a week (Article 3 of State Council Rules on
Working Hours) and overtime should not exceed
3 hours a day (Article 41 of Labor Law). Lu saw
no hope for himself or prospects for the future.
Another online post dated 14 March 2010 reads:140
If  I  really  could,  I’d  write  music
every day. I  don’t have money [to
buy] music hardware equipment. I
don’t even want to spend money on
a  computer.  I  can’t  find  a  record
company either.  Youth  flies  away.
The 24 years of me, can I still do it?
Lu loved music and wanted to be a professional
singer. He even took part in the company singing
contest and won second prize. But in reality he
was  responsible  for  monotonous  tasks  in  the
assembly workshop. By early May he was on the
verge  of  a  breakdown.  He  reportedly  showed
symptoms of delusions like “being followed and
threatened by someone who wants to kill him.”
On that sleepless night, his university classmate
and co-worker recalled Lu’s final words:141
He said he was going to look at the
scenery and right after he finished
his sentence, he quickly opened the
window  and  jumped  onto  the
balcony, then jumped off from the
balcony. He never hesitated. I tried
to  grab  him,  but  only  pulled  the
clothes on his left arm, he threw my
hand off.
Lu’s  job  was  quality  control.  If  he  failed  to
monitor  the  high quality  of  finished products,
every worker in the same production department
and he himself would be punished.142 As a result,
he was very nervous about the passing rates of
products, fearing punishment or that the bonus
would be cut.
The  younger  generation  of  better-educated
migrant workers wants a new life but they see no
prospect  in  toiling  day  and  night  on  the
standardized assembly lines.  They face a huge
discrepancy  between  soaring  expectations  and
the harsh reality of factory lives.143  Only a few
days  after  the  suicide  of  Lu  Xin,  24-year-old
Henan worker  Zhu Chenming jumped off  the
roof of an apartment to her death (dubbed the
“8th jumper”). A friend told of her big dreams of
success as a super model:144
She’s  1.74-meter  tall .  [Before
entering Foxconn] she learned about
modeling.  Her  aspiration  was  to
travel abroad to study.
In the evening on 11 May 2010, Zhu’s dead body
was found lying on the ground. All the glamour
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had dissipated from her young life.
Workers-of-rural-origins  are  marginalized  and
excluded  materially  and  culturally.  Younger
workers  in  particular  feel  insecure,  neither
belonging  to  the  city  nor  able  to  return  to  a
livelihood  in  the  countryside.  Every  day,
hundreds of young workers quit their jobs and
leave  the  “walled  city”  of  Foxconn.  But  those
who  hop  to  other  factories  quickly  find
themselves being exploited in more or less the
same  way  as  at  Foxconn.  Some  have  their
employment  histories  brought  to  an  end  by
industrial  accidents.145  Still  others,  under
desperate  conditions,  have  taken  their  own
lives.146
Thirteen young organizers picketed an Apple
store in San Francisco on 17 June 2010. They
carried placards showing the names and ages
of 12 of the 13 Foxconn suicide victims whose
names are known, and an unnamed placard
for the 13th. They had a moment of silence for
each of them. On the “DeathPad,” reads
“Workers want justice.” Photo credit: Chinese
Progressive Association San Francisco.
Nine  mainland  Chinese  and  Hong  Kong
academics issued an open statement calling on
Foxconn and the government to do justice to the
younger  generation  of  migrant  workers.147  The
statement reads painfully:
From  the  moment  they  [the  new
generation of migrant workers] step
beyond the  doors  of  their  houses,
they never  think of  going back to
farming  like  their  parents.  In  this
sense,  they  see  no  other  option
when they enter  the  city  to  work.
The moment they see there is little
possibility of building a home in the
city  through  hard  work,  the  very
meaning  of  their  work  collapses.
The path ahead is blocked, and the
road to retreat is closed. Trapped in
this situation, the new generation of
migrant  workers  faces  a  serious
identity  crisis  and,  in  effect,  this
magnifies  psychological  and
emotional  problems.  Digging  into
this deeper level of our societal and
structural  conditions,  we  come
closer to understanding the “no way
back”  mentality  of  these  Foxconn
employees.
The pressure of being away from home, and with
little care and fairness from society, was among
the  major  factors  behind  the  employee
suicides.148  Millions  of  migrant  workers  like
Foxconn employees  are  thrown into  a  state  of
deep contradiction.  They reject  the  regimented
hardships their  predecessors endured as cheap
labor  and  second-class  citizens.  They  rebel
against  their  marginal ized  status  and
meaningless life. “So their only option was a very
human  one,”  a  labor  scholar  commented,  “to
throw away or  destroy their  own bodies  as  a
gesture  of  frustration—and  of  defiance.”149  In
their  defiant  deaths  they  call  on  the  Chinese
nation—and international  society—to  wake  up
before more lives are sacrificed.
Conclusion
China’s emergence as a global economic power
could not have occurred without the painstaking
efforts of the older and younger generations of
migrant  workers.  The  Foxconn  suicides  have
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received  much  media  attention  and  yet  many
other  workers  toil  under  equally  terrible
conditions. We believe that the labor and human
rights issues raised by this human tragedy go far
beyond the specific conditions at Foxconn, and
demand  wide-ranging  changes  at  both  the
industry  and  governmental  levels.
The suppression of wages to jump-start export-
processing industries in the 1980s brought about
a large influx of foreign investments to China.
Accelerated  in  the  1990s,  transnational
companies  and  Taiwanese  contractors  have
outsourced  low-value-added  production  to
Chinese  manufacturers.  Millions  of  export-
oriented  factories  are  subject  to  order
spec i f i ca t ions  o f  Wes tern  and  As ian
multinationals. Profit margins in labor processing
remain  small.  At  the  international  level,
producers  from  Vietnam,  India,  Cambodia,
Bangladesh and other developing countries are
pitted against China in a battle to become sub-tier
suppliers  further  down  the  global  commodity
supply chain. On factory floors, workers bear the
brunt of cost cutting pressures.
Young rural migrant workers have become the
backbone of China’s urban export industry. They
are  underpaid  and  heavily  squeezed.  Image-
sensitive  global  buyers  and  their  suppliers
sometimes  express  concern  for  the  workers’
treatment. But often this seems simply business-
as -usual  rhetor ic  o f  corporate  soc ia l
responsibility (CSR). Critics point out the reality
behind the rhetoric:150
T h e  p r om i s e s  o f  C S R
programs—now a  US$40  billion-a-
year  business  globally—have  been
fatally  undermined  by  the  “iron
triangle” of lowest possible per-unit
price, highest possible quality, and
fastest  possible  delivery  times.
Contractor  factories  are  provided
with no financial  support  for  CSR
policies  required  by  the  brands;
instead  they  face  slashed  profit
margins  and  additional  costs  that
can  be  made  up  only  by  further
squeezing their own labor force.
Workers’ youthful years are worn away to the
rhythm of the machines as parts and components
flow by. Occupational health, and even precious
life, is sacrificed.
Foxconn’s strategy of low-cost, suppressed-labor-
rights  competitiveness  is  neither  economically
sustainable  nor  morally  supportable.  As  the
biggest electronics contract manufacturer in the
world, Foxconn churns out massive volumes of
goods designed by global companies. Although
its profit margins are slim, its total profits and
market share are large. Still, the company does
not  provide  its  employees  a  living  wage,
appropriate  working  conditions,  or  adequate
benefits. Excessive overtime, high level of work-
related stress, and disrespect for workers’ right to
union representation is  built-in to the Foxconn
management  system.  Under  these  extreme
conditions, at least 13 Foxconn employees chose
to  end  their  lives  within  five  months  of  this
year.151  To  prevent  similar  tragedies  from
happening at  Foxconn and other factories  it  is
critical,  first  and  foremost,  to  assure  workers’
rights  to  democratic  union  organization  and
collective  bargaining.  Strengthening  the
participation  of  workers  in  enterprise
management  will  help  improve  working
conditions.  We  encourage  independent
nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs)  and
credible  union  leaders  to  offer  participatory
training in workers’ rights at the workplace level.
Furthermore,  we  advocate  joint  monitoring  of
company  grievance  mechanisms  by  local
governments  and  external  parties,  excluding
those  who  are  linked  to  corporate  interests.
We are concerned about the role of the local and
national  states  in  the  protection  of  the  new
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working class. The use of a large pool of young
migrant  labor  to  fuel  China’s  export-driven
economy  comes  at  too  high  a  human  cost.
Migrant workers’ basic needs for housing, social
security, and education for their children are not
protected by the local  government.  As long as
these real problems are not solved, the mental or
psychological problems that have been magnified
will  never  disappear.  The  government  should
redistribute  income  and  guarantee  benefits  to
rural residents and migrant workers to improve
living  standards.  Institutional  discrimination
against  migrant  workers,  based  on  rural
household registration and other policies, must
be  eliminated  to  facilitate  labor  mobility  and
reduce  labor  market  segmentation  and
discrimination at the expense of rural workers.
Workers’ participation in social and labor reform
will  build  the  community  resources  to  reduce
suicides.  Overall,  a  more  balanced urban-rural
development model is key to social and economic
stability.
On 8 June 2010 the Global Day of
Remembrance for Foxconn Victims and
Foxconn’s Annual General Meeting, student
protestors from SACOM, Hong Kong labor
unions, and rights groups demonstrated
outside a local Apple store to hold Apple and
Foxconn accountable to workers’ rights.
 Photo credit: Students & Scholars Against
Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM).
Suicide is the most desperate form of protest. It
should not be used as a means to resist  social
injustice. Concrete improvements should start at
Foxconn but certainly should not end there. Since
May 2010, condolence events for Foxconn victims
and their families were organized in Shenzhen,
Beij ing,  Hong  Kong,  Taipei,  New  York,
Washington D.C., San Francisco, Boston, Canada,
Mexico, the Czech Republic, Berlin, Amsterdam,
Switzerland,  France,  Australia,  South  Korea,
India, and other places around the world.152 On
22 July, two days immediately after the apparent
suicide of an 18-year-old male student-worker at
the  Foxconn  Foshan  plant  in  Guangdong
province,153  a  coalition  of  45  institutional
investors  worldwide issued a  public  statement
calling for ethical, socially-conscious investment
and  improved  conditions  in  electronics
manufacturing  facilities  in  the  entire  global
supply chain.154  On 4 August, despite installing
safety  nets  around  the  building  premises,  22-
year-old Liu fell to her death from a dormitory in
the Foxconn Kunshan facility in eastern Jiangsu
province.155
Amid new cases of young worker suicides this
summer,  Foxconn organized a  morale-boosting
rally for its young employees at a stadium in the
Shenzhen  Longhua  plant  on  18  August  2010.
Some  workers  dressed  in  company-provided,
pink-color  t-shirts  with  big  red  words  “I  love
Foxconn.” Others, in cheerleader costumes, held
up  huge  posters  of  CEO  Terry  Gou  that  say
“Love me, love you, love Terry.”156
Love me, love you, love Terry
At the time, all 20,000 Foxconn participants stood
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up  and  chanted  slogans,  orchestrated  by
company  organizers.  A  high-level  manager
loudly  exhorted  the  young  people:  “Treasure
your life, love your family!”157 Most importantly,
he shouted: “Let us care for each other to build a
wonderful future.”158
Without  stronger  protection  of  workers’
fundamental  rights  to  strive  for  decent  work,
however, whatever the corporate hype, it seems
almost  certain that  we will  witness  a  growing
roll-call of deaths.
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4  Company  description  in  Hon  Hai  Precision
Industry  statement  dated  26  April  2010.
http://www.honhai.com.tw/Revenue/Pr2009_
Q4.pdf.
5  Sun  Yap ing .  20  May  2010 .  Foxconn
spokesperson responds to "9 consecutive jumps,"
acknowledging  management  problems.
Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily) [in
Chinese].
6 Austin Ramzy. 16 December 2009. Runners up:
the Chinese worker. Time.
7  Wang Yi  (Net  Ease).  9  April  2010.  Who can
bring the Foxconn "suicide express" to a halt? [in
Chinese].
8  Appeal  by  concerned  international  scholars:
create humane labor standards at Foxconn and
end  "stealth  manufacturing"  in  information
technology! 8 June 2010. Signatories are posted
on l i n e  a t  s a c om .hk/a r c h i v e s/ 6 4 9
(http://sacom.hk/archives/649).
9  According to a timeline of  milestones on the
Foxconn  website,  in  2006,  the  company  was
named one of the "best employers in China" by a
C h i n aHR . c om  p o l l .
www.foxconn.com/PullulateCourse.html
(http://www.foxconn.com/PullulateCourse.htm
l).
10  Dagongmei  /  dagongzai  (female  /  male
migrant  workers)  is  a  new  gender  and  class
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